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1 Introduction
Consider a local government seeking to procure a public good or service on behalf of its citizens.
On top of choosing the exact nature of the good or service provided, the government has also to
decide the production mode. It may either manage the service itself under public ownership or
outsource the activity to the private sector. In that case, a private company is selected following
a bidding procedure. A partnership is then developed between the local government and the
company which provides the service. The goal of this paper is to understand the contractual
forms that such delegated management may take when the quality of the infrastructure is key
to the social value of the service.
Although the scope of our analysis is more general, the water industry provides a meaningful
illustration of this problem. Local governments have indeed to decide whether to delegate water
production to the private sector or to maintain it under their own control. Partnerships between
the public and the private sectors for distributing drinking water or treating waste water differ
greatly from one municipality to the next. In France for instance, although some localities still
manage production through public agencies – the so-called re´gies municipales – the dominating
contractual form over the past century has been leasing contracts or “affermage”.1 In this case,
a private entity, independent of the local government, is hired to manage the service and operate
facilities. These facilities may have been built and operated in the past by the municipalities
themselves. In the course of such operations, municipalities acquire private knowledge about
the quality of the existing assets.2 Within this class of leasing contracts, various kinds of
arrangements can be found which differ in terms of how financial and operating risks are shared.
Those contracts typically involve a lump-sum payment, a fixed regulated price for consumers
and a share of the realized profit. Depending on the share left to the contractors, the contracts
may embody high power incentives to exert effort in operating and managing assets, or instead
implement much lower power incentives.
One critical feature of the water industry is the fact that, although the quality of the in-
frastructure drives the price paid by consumers, the quality of the service, here water supply, is
easily verifiable. Indeed, either in the U.S. with the Safe Drinking Water Act or in France with
the 1992 Water Act, the minimal water quality standards are the same for all water providers
and are quite easily checked by regulators. A second important feature of this activity, as for
many public services,3 is that rather small and poorly diversified local governments delegate
to private contractors - typically, large private companies operating on several markets - the
management of assets on which the local governments have a priori private information.
1Similar contracting forms can be found in the U.K. and elsewhere in the world. In the US, 2400 municipally
owned water utilities are operated in partnership with private contract operators. This business has grown an
average 19% per year over the last seven years.
2For instance, a municipality may learn which of the existing assets (pumps, water pipes, metering systems,
etc...) should be renovated and when.
3Water wastes, waste disposal and transportation would be other significant examples.
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Starting from those specific features, this paper presents a theory explaining the shape of
delegation contracts and the kinds of public/private partnerships which can emerge in practice.
When a local government (hereafter the principal) is privately informed about the quality of
the infrastructure that a potential service provider (the agent) will use, the design of concession
contracts acts as a signal of the facility quality to the private sector. We analyze how this
signaling issue interacts with the moral hazard problem that the local government faces when it
delegates production to the private sector.
Local governments are assumed to be risk averse. In a regulatory context, this assumption
has been defended by Lewis and Sappington (1995) who argue that it can be viewed as a
convenient short-cut to model financial constraints especially when those regulators represent
small localities. Had the quality of the infrastructure been common knowledge, risk aversion
on the principal’s side would justify shifting all risk to the private sector not only for insurance
reasons but also because it provides full incentives when the agent’s effort in running assets is
non-observable in a moral hazard environment.
Instead, when the local government is privately informed on the assets quality, contract
design results from the interaction between two major forces. On the one hand, by keeping a
share of the financial and operational risk, the local government credibly conveys information on
the quality of the infrastructure. On the other hand, by keeping some risk, the local government
reduces the agent’s incentives to exert an effort. There is thus a trade-off between signaling and
moral hazard. At a separating equilibrium of our game of contractual offers, local governments
with a high quality infrastructure are ready to pay a premium to separate themselves from those
with a low quality one.
Our model provides a number of sharp predictions. First, in the fully separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium we select, the amount of risk kept by the local government increases with
the quality of the infrastructure. The private sector is made residual claimant only for the
worst infrastructures. When profit results both from the intrinsic quality of the infrastructure
and from the contractor’s effort, profit is a U-shaped function of the infrastructure quality.
Second, full privatization emerges only for the worst quality infrastructures whereas the best ones
remain under public management. Indeed, because sometimes profits are not easily verifiable,
profit-sharing schemes between the public and the private sectors cannot always be written. In
this case, the only signaling tool available to the local government is whether it retains assets
ownership or not. Fully separating allocations can certainly no longer occur in such environments
because the crude allocation of property rights cannot account for the continuum of possible
values of the assets quality. A semi-separating equilibrium may nevertheless arise where public
ownership and low power incentives come with the high quality assets whereas private ownership
and high power incentives prevail otherwise.
The empirical evidence on the impact of ownership on performance are hard to interpret,
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since most of them are rather partial, and often suffer from an endogeneity bias - ownership being
itself something to be explained. Nevertheless, the few studies taking into account this bias are
consistent with our main prediction, i.e., the positive relationship between public ownership/low
power incentives and infrastructure quality.
Let us now review the relevant literature. Although our primary concern is on the shape of
concession contracts, this paper is also more broadly related to the literature on privatization
and to the lively debate on the boundary between the private and the public sectors. An
important benchmark is given there by the “Irrelevance Theorem” due to Sappington and Stiglitz
(1987). This Theorem establishes that, provided contracting takes place ex ante (i.e., before
any uncertainty is resolved) between a risk neutral private firm and a government, delegating
production to the private sector comes with no loss even though control of the productive assets
may give an informational advantage to the operating firm. We depart from their assumptions
by assuming that the principal already possesses private information at the time of contracting
with the private sector. The principal becomes then an active player with his own incentives to
manipulate information. This cost of signaling makes full privatization less attractive than in
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) and provides a fresh perspective on the make-or-buy problem.4
Other authors, such as Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hart (2003), have analyzed the
impact of allocating residual rights of control a` la Grossman and Hart (1986) on incentives to
perform specific investments. For instance, Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have investigated
the costs and benefits of private ownership in a framework where the quality of the service
is non-verifiable. They highlight a trade-off between an excessive tendency to reduce both
quality and cost under private ownership and an incentive to reduce only quality under public
ownership. Although it applies reasonably well for some public services (like prison management
for instance), this trade-off does not seem so relevant for others like water supply, waste disposal,
and transportation, where the major concern is with the existing quality of the infrastructure
not with the quality of the service itself which is observable and heavily regulated.
The idea that an informed and risk averse party may want to bear part of the financial risk
of a project to signal its quality to risk neutral parties is well known in the finance literature
beginning with the seminal paper by Leland and Pyle (1977). Building on a similar insight,
Perotti (1995) has shown how partial privatization may in fact help a government to signal
its willingness not to behave opportunistically once the sector is privatized. Contrary to this
literature, profits are endogenous in our paper and depend on the effort of the agent to whom
the production task is delegated. This leads to an interesting trade-off between signaling and
moral hazard which explains the existing mixed evidence on ownership patterns and efficiency.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) also discuss delegation to the private sector versus direct public
management. Focusing on the choice between fixed-price and cost plus contracts, they show why
4By stressing asymmetric information on the principal’s side at the time of contracting, we model a setting
where the principal has in fact a limited commitment ability since ex ante contracting is no longer possible.
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the latter may be preferred. Cost-plus contracts allow ex post efficient renegotiation in spite of
their perverse impact on the agent’s cost reducing effort. They interpret cost-plus contracts as
in-house production while fixed-price contracts are identified with outsourcing. There as well
as in Levin and Tadelis (2004), the analysis follows an incomplete contracting approach where
quality which is an essential feature of the service remains non-verifiable. As we argued above,
this assumption does not seem to correspond to cases where the quality of the service is in fact
regulated by law. We see thus our approach as complementary to theirs.
Lastly, our model belongs to the realm of informed principal theory. Because the agent’s
expected returns depend on the quality of the assets he operates, the model entails common
values a` la Maskin and Tirole (1992) with the added twist that the agent exerts a non-verifiable
effort. Since we consider instead a model with a continuum of possible quality levels for the
infrastructure, we have to rely on the tools developed by Mailath (1987) to characterize fully
separating allocations. In a context that differs from ours both in terms of modeling technology
and focus, Beaudry (1994) also analyzes an informed principal’s problem under moral hazard on
the agent’s side. He shows that the principal may want to decrease the bonus and, when types
are discrete and sufficiently apart, give some positive rents to a risk neutral employee to signal a
good technology. In our model with a continuous level of quality, rent extraction always occurs
for the separating equilibria we focus on.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the case where the quality of the infras-
tructure is common knowledge. Section 4 is the core of the paper. We introduce there private
information on the principal’s side, highlight the basic trade-off between signaling and incentives
and discuss its impact on the ownership structure. Section 5 explores several extensions of the
model. Section 6 discusses our findings in view of the empirical literature on the efficiency of the
private and the public sectors in the water industry. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated
to an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider the relationship between a risk averse principal and a risk neutral agent producing
a public service on behalf of the principal. To produce, the agent uses assets whose quality is
only known by the principal. This principal can be thought of as a small and poorly diversified
locality. The risk neutral agent represents instead a large firm which is generally well-diversified
since it might operate also in a large number of similar markets. Although we keep in mind
water supply as the main application of the paper, this hierarchical relationship can also be
viewed as a canonical model for the delegated management of most public services.
The gross consumer’s benefit from the project is exogenously fixed at S which is known by
both the principal and the agent. The project yields a random profit p˜i. This profit depends
5
first on the innate quality θ of the facility used to provide the service. In the case of water
supply, this can be viewed as the quality of the water network which is, to a large extent, only
known by the principal at the time of delegating its management. This assumption is certainly
relevant when the principal has already built and run the service himself for a long time under
some form of public ownership.
The quality parameter θ belongs to the set [θ, θ¯]. It is drawn from an atomless distribution
F (·) having an everywhere positive density f(·). We denote by E(θ) the average quality of the
infrastructure.
By exerting an effort e which has a non-monetary cost ψ(e) = e
2
2 , the agent increases realized
profits. This effort is supposed to be non-observable so that the principal faces a moral hazard
problem when delegating production to the agent.
Realized profits are also affected by some random shock ε˜ which is normally distributed with
zero mean and variance σ2. This randomness captures all the financial and operational risks the
operator may face.5
Finally, realized profits increase with the innate quality of the technology, the manager’s
effort and the random shock through the simple additive formula:
p˜i = θ + e+ ε˜.
Those realized profits are the only observable variables available to write a contract between
the principal and his agent. Since profits are verifiable, this is a matter of convention to assume
that the principal enjoys directly those profits and pays the agent a transfer t(p˜i) to perform the
public service on his behalf.6
The principal has a CARA utility function, υ(·), with a coefficient of risk aversion r > 0.
Risk aversion is justified in the case of a local government for which the service to be delegated
represents a significant share of its overall budget.7
For tractability, we will focus on linear profit-sharing contracts between the principal and
his agent. Those contracts are of the form t(p˜i) = bp˜i − a. The fraction b ∈ [0, 1] represents
a bonus parameter proportional to the realized profit. This bonus will determine the agent’s
marginal incentives to provide effort whereas a is a fixed-fee paid by the agent to the local
government to get access to the assets. Those contracts are thus similar to those found in prac-
tice. Indeed, contracts for delegated management involve generally the payment by a company
of a lump-sum and a proportional bonus. Of course, restricting the analysis to those linear
contracts may entail a loss of generality. Nevertheless, we will see below that linear contracts
are already enough to implement the optimal outcome when the quality of the infrastructure
5In the case of water supply, this may be random perturbations or incidents on the network but also unpre-
dictable variations in the costs of various inputs to the production process.
6Things are of course different in the case of non-verifiable profits analyzed in Section 4.2.
7Again, this is certainly the case for water supply.
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θ is common knowledge. Under asymmetric information, optimality of the linear contracts is
generally not obtained.8 However, restricting the analysis to simple linear contracts leads us to a
quite tractable analysis which shows simply how signaling issues affect contracting. Maintaining
this linearity assumption allows also for clearer comparisons with the benchmark of complete
information.
Following our conventions, only a fraction 1− b of the profit is kept by the principal. Hence-
forth, the certainty equivalent of the principal’s utility can be written as:
V = E (S + (1− b)p˜i + a|θ)− r(1− b)
2
2
var (p˜i|θ) .
Similarly, the risk neutral agent’s expected utility is:
U = E(bp˜i − a− ψ(e)|e).
The agent’s outside opportunity gives him a reservation payoff that is exogenously normalized
to zero. The fact that the principal has all bargaining power in contracting with the agent
captures the existing ex ante competition among identical potential service providers.
3 Complete Information
When the quality of the infrastructure θ is common knowledge, signaling is not a concern.
The contractual solution is then well-known. The principal can achieve the first-best outcome
by selling to the risk neutral agent the rights to provide the service for a fixed-fee a∗(θ) and
letting that agent bear the full consequences of his effort choice which amounts to set a maximal
bonus b∗(θ) = b∗ = 1.9 Accordingly, in some of the interpretations of our model below, we
will sometimes refer to an activity as being privately controlled when the manager of the public
utility enjoys all the marginal returns of his activity.
With this linear sell-out contract, the agent has full incentives to exert effort and cost mini-
mization leads to a first-best effort level e∗ which is independent of the technology, ψ′(e∗) = e∗ =
1. This scheme provides also full insurance to the principal since he enjoys a fixed return a∗(θ)
whatever the operational costs. Finally, the fixed-fee a∗(θ) is set by the principal to extract the
whole expected profit from running the facilities made by the agent so that:
a∗(θ) = θ + e∗ − ψ(e∗). (1)
Importantly, the principal extracts more from the agent as the technology improves (the
fixed-fee a∗(θ) increases with θ). The principal has thus strong incentives to overstate the
8We are not aware of any work deriving fully optimal contracts in our signaling environment.
9A sell-out contract would also still be optimal if the principal could commit ex ante, i.e., before he knows θ.
With such a contract, the principal would then be fully insured against both operational and quality shocks, the
agent would still have maximal incentives and his expected profit could again be extracted.
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quality of the technology when it is non-observable by the agent. Asymmetric information on
the quality of the technology will induce a cost of signaling information to the uninformed agent
if the principal wants to credibly convince this agent that the infrastructure is of a good quality.
We investigate the nature of that cost in the next section.
4 Delegated Management
4.1 Profit Sharing Schemes and Separating Contracts
Let us now suppose that only the principal knows θ at the time of contracting. The principal
wants to design a mechanism which both induces effort from the risk neutral agent and signals
the value of the assets. From a theoretical viewpoint, this is an informed principal problem in a
moral hazard environment with common values since the principal’s type θ affects directly the
agent’s expectations over the realized profits. 10
To describe separating equilibrium allocations, we first define a separating contract as a
family of profit-sharing schemes
{
t(pi, θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
such that different types of principals offer different
schemes. Given the linearity of the contracts, those schemes are fully defined in terms of the
pairs {(a(θˆ), b(θˆ))}θˆ∈Θ.11
The mere offer of such a separating contract {(a(θ), b(θ))}θ∈Θ signals to the agent the innate
quality of the assets θ. The agent chooses then both whether to participate or not and the effort
level e(θ) he will undertake.
Using the concavity of the agent’s objective function, this effort is fully defined from the
bonus as:
e(θ) = argmax
e
E (b(θ)p˜i − a(θ)|θ, e)− ψ(e) = b(θ) for all θ in Θ. (2)
This effort choice is thus independent of the fixed-fee. However, this fixed-fee has an impact
on the agent’s decision to participate which requires:
a(θ) ≤ E (b(θ)p˜i|θ, e(θ))− ψ(e(θ)) = θb(θ) + (b(θ))
2
2
for all θ in Θ. (3)
10Because we model a game with a continuum of types, Maskin and Tirole (1992)’s methodology for informed
principal games does not directly apply. In their approach, the principal can a priori offer a mechanism including
an extra round of communication ex post, i.e., when the agent has already accepted the contract and the principal
communicates his type. We will reduce the space of available mechanisms by suppressing this communication
stage. The mere offer of a linear contract signals through the choice of the fixed-fee and the bonus the principal’s
innate type. With this simplifying feature in hands and a simple equilibrium refinement that we describe below,
we will be able to use the techniques developed by Mailath (1987) for signaling games with a continuum of types
to derive fully separating allocations.
11Separating equilibria are attractive in our context because the equilibrium allocation does not depend on the
probability of the different types. Moreover, in a discrete two-type version of our model, it can be shown that
the least-costly separating allocation that we select survives standard refinements for signaling games like the
Cho-Kreps criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)) and Divinity (see Banks and Sobel (1987)).
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We can now define a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our contractual game as
follows:
Lemma 1 : A separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game of contractual offer is a
family of linear contracts t(pi, θˆ) = −a(θˆ) + b(θˆ)pi for all θˆ ∈ Θ such that:
• t(pi, ·) is a one-to-one mapping from Θ into the space of linear contracts of the form −a+bpi.
• Given the offer t(pi, θˆ), the risk neutral agent accepts the contract and exerts the effort
e(θˆ).
• A principal with type θ prefers to offer t(pi, θ) rather than t(pi, θˆ):
θ = argmax
θˆ
{
S + a(θˆ) + (1− b(θˆ))(θ + b(θˆ))− rσ
2
2
(1− b(θˆ))2
}
. (4)
• Following any unexpected offer t(pi) = −a + bpi /∈ {t(pi, θˆ)}θˆ∈Θ, the agent holds the most
pessimistic beliefs 12 µ(θ|t(pi)) = 1 which implies that the principal prefers the equilibrium
contract t(pi, θ) to any other unexpected offer that may be accepted by the agent:
S + a(θ) + (1− b(θ))(θ + b(θ))− rσ
2
2
(1− b(θ))2 ≥
max
{b∈[0,1],a≤θb+ b2
2
}
{S + a+ (1− b)(θ + b)− rσ
2
2
(1− b)2}. (5)
There are many possible schedules a(·) which satisfy both the agent’s participation constraint
(3) and the principal’s incentive constraints (4) and (5). Among these equilibria, we shall focus
on the undominated ones from the principal’s viewpoint. For those allocations, the agent’s
participation constraint (3) is in fact binding. We thereby easily derive the fixed-fee from this
binding constraint and rewrite the principal’s incentive compatibility constraint (4) as:
θ = argmax
θˆ
{
S + θ +
1
2
+ (θˆ − θ)b(θˆ)− (1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θˆ))2
}
. (6)
Therefore, in any undominated separating equilibrium, the signal used by the principal ends
up being really one-dimensional. This allows us to apply the techniques due to Mailath (1987)
to characterize the unique undominated separating equilibrium of our game.
Lemma 2 : In any undominated separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, b(·) is monotonically
decreasing and thus almost everywhere differentiable with b˙(θ) ≤ 0.
12Those pessimistic beliefs are similar to those used in Mailath (1987). This allows us to adapt his findings to
our setting even though, a priori, the principal can signal his type through a two-dimensional vector (a, b) whereas
Mailath (1987) considers only one-dimensional signaling.
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Using Lemma 2, we get the following characterization:
Proposition 1 : Assume that θ¯ − θ < 12(1 + rσ2).13 There exists a unique undominated sepa-
rating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (aS(·), bS(·)) characterized as follows:
• bS(θ) = 1, (7)
• b˙S(θ) = − b
S(θ)
(1 + rσ2)(1− bS(θ)) . (8)
• aS(θ) = bS(θ)θ + (b
S(θ))2
2
. (9)
This equilibrium is sustained with pessimistic out of equilibrium beliefs:
µ(θ|(a, b)) = 1 for any (a, b) /∈ {aS(θ), bS(θ)}θ∈Θ.
The “local” incentive constraint (6) taken between two nearby types θ and θ − dθ yields (8)
by simple differentiation. Clearly, the “full-information” outcome b∗(θ) = 1 never solves this
differential equation. To separate himself from the nearby type θ−dθ (dθ > 0), a principal with
type θ must keep a share of the operational risk associated to the project.
By incurring those signaling costs, the principal can convince the agent of the quality of
the infrastructure and extract more from the agent with the fixed-fee. Of course, the agent
no longer enjoys the full return on any profit-enhancing effort he may undertake. Formally,
1− bS(θ) > 0 for all θ > θ. Low power incentives result then from the principal’s willingness to
signal his type. This points at the fundamental trade-off faced by the informed principal in this
environment. Selling the firm for a fixed-fee would provide the agent with first-best incentives.
However, it does not convey information to the uninformed agent and, accordingly, the principal
would have to offer a lower fixed-fee to convince the agent to participate. Keeping part of the
operational risk signals a better technology to the agent. This strategy has nevertheless two
costly drawbacks. On the one hand, the risk averse principal is no longer fully insured. On
the other hand, since the risk neutral agent no longer enjoys the full return on his effort, the
incentives to work are reduced.
We formalize these important insights in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 : Assume that θ¯ − θ < 12(1 + rσ2). The unique undominated separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium has then the following features:
• The risk averse principal always bears a share of the operational risk except when assets
are of the worst quality θ, 0 < bS(θ) < 1 for all θ > θ;
13This qualifier ensures that unexpected deviations are never profitable when the equilibrium is sustained with
pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
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• The profit sharing parameter bS(θ) is greater as r and σ2 increase and as θ decreases;
• The risk neutral agent exerts less than the first-best effort except for the worst quality
assets, eS(θ) ≤ 1 = e∗ for all θ ≤ θ¯ with equality only at θ¯.
The interesting new insight at this point comes from the comparative statics with respect to
the principal’s degree of risk aversion r and the variance of the noise on the agent’s performance
σ2. The more risk averse the principal is and the noisier the agent’s performance, the more
the principal’s expected utility decreases after a small reduction in b. As the local government
becomes more risk averse or performances are more noisy, signaling becomes easier because even
keeping only a small share of the risk may have a significant cost in terms both of risk borne
and of dampened incentives. The agent is under high power incentives and bS(·) is uniformly
greater for all values of θ as r and σ2 increases. At the extreme, the greatest distortion arises
when the principal is risk neutral since the cost of signaling due to the loss of insurance now
disappears.
Henceforth, if one thinks of risk aversion as a modeling short-cut for fiscal or financial
constraints at the local government level, our model predicts that relaxing those constraints
reduces the incentive power of concession contracts.
So far our results suggest that, since efficient management and first-best incentives only
come with the worst technologies, there could be a strong negative profit relationship between
infrastructure quality and performances. This view is in fact only partially correct as shown in
the next proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume that (log2− 12)(1 + rσ2) < θ¯ − θ < 1+rσ
2
2 . Then, there exists θˆ ∈ [θ, θ¯]
such that the firm’s expected profit in equilibrium is decreasing with θ as long as θ < θˆ and
increasing otherwise.
To understand how profit changes with the quality of the infrastructure, one must take into
account two conflicting effects. First, increasing the quality raises the level of profit for a given
effort level. Second, since effort is equal to the bonus parameter, it decreases with the quality of
the infrastructure. The first of these effects may dominate only for large uncertainty on quality
whereas the first one is always present even for the worst technologies. The total impact on
the equilibrium profit level may therefore be ambiguous and profit as a function of θ may be
U-shaped.
4.2 Ownership Structures
It is worth reinterpreting our results in terms of ownership structures. To model ownership in a
crude way, let us suppose, as the property right literature does, that profits are non-verifiable so
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that contracts are incomplete and profit-sharing schemes are not feasible. We follow Holmstro¨m
and Milgrom (1991) and others in assuming that whoever owns the assets enjoys the full return
streams on these assets.14 If assets are under public ownership, the principal enjoys all return
streams on those assets even though he may not run those assets himself and still has to hire a
civil servant or to set up a bureau to operate them. If assets are privately owned, the operating
agent enjoys the returns.
In our framework, distinguishing between those two ownership structures amounts to re-
stricting the space of contracts available so that either b = 0 under public ownership or b = 1
under private ownership. This restriction on the space of possible signals that the principal may
use makes it of course impossible to sustain a fully separating equilibrium. The principal may
nevertheless still set different lump-sum payments a1 and a2 depending on whether he relies on
private or public ownership even though he is no longer able to fine tune contract design to the
quality of the infrastructure.
Let us thus look for a semi-separating equilibrium with a cut-off rule θ∗. A principal having
a sufficiently bad quality infrastructure (θ ≤ θ∗) chooses to privatize whereas he chooses public
production otherwise. In the first case, the agent exerts the first-best effort e∗ = 1 whereas, no
effort whatsoever is exerted under public ownership. This immediately yields that a2 = 0 and
a1 = 12 +
∫ θ∗
θ θf(θ)dθ
F (θ∗) .
The cut-off type θ∗ is just indifferent between privatizing or not so that:
θ∗ =
1 + rσ2
2
+
∫ θ∗
θ θf(θ)dθ
F (θ∗)
. (10)
Obviously, θ∗ is interior when:
θ¯ >
1 + rσ2
2
+ E(θ), (11)
i.e., when there is enough uncertainty on the quality of the technology.
Proposition 4 : Assume that (11) and ddθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
> 0 hold. When the only feasible contracts
consist of allocating ownership rights ex ante, there exists a semi-separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium such that a principal with type θ ≤ θ∗ chooses to privatize whereas he chooses public
ownership when his type θ > θ∗. The cut-off θ∗ increases with r and σ2.
A local government with a low quality infrastructure finds it worth selling the assets to the
private sector for a fixed-fee. Instead, a local government with a high quality infrastructure
chooses to keep ownership of the productive assets and to enjoy all returns on these assets.
14The implicit assumption here is that whoever owns the asset has all the ex post bargaining power in the
negotiation that may take place between the principal and the agent to share ex post profit. This assumption
although very convenient from a modeling standpoint could be relaxed.
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Proposition 4 suggests that local governments who face a harder budget constraint and thus
could be modeled as being more risk averse are also the more likely to privatize.
Public ownership is more likely when high quality facilities are at stake, when principals are
less risk averse or when the noise in measuring the agent’s performance is lower. The fact that
high quality infrastructures tend indeed to be kept under public ownership may thus mask any
other cost advantages that private service providers may have.
5 Extensions
5.1 Risk Averse Firms
With a risk neutral firm and under complete information on θ, all operational risks should be
shifted to the agent. In practice, firms are not as well diversified. Because of the large scale
projects they sometimes manage, they may be modeled (at least to some extent) also as being
risk averse.15 Even when the quality of the infrastructure is common knowledge, an optimal
partnership between the local government and the firm should allocate risk according to the risk
tolerances of both parties. Concerns for coinsurance determine a risk allocation which is less
extreme than what we saw in Section 3.
Let us denote by ρ the constant degree of risk aversion of the agent, assuming that the
agent’s preferences are represented by a CARA utility function. If the quality parameter θ is
common knowledge, the agent chooses an effort e(θ) such that
e(θ) = argmax
e
E (−a(θ) + b(θ)p˜i|θ, e)− ρ
2
var (p˜i|θ, e)b2(θ)− ψ(e)
and we find again that e(θ) is given by (2).
To induce the agent’s acceptance of the contract, the fixed-fee must now be such that
θb(θ) +
(1− ρσ2)
2
b2(θ)− a(θ) ≥ 0. (12)
Because the agent must receive a risk-premium to participate, the principal cannot increase the
fee a(θ) as much as with a risk neutral firm.
Under complete information on θ, the principal’s problem becomes then
max
{a(θ),b(θ)}
a(θ) + (θ + b(θ))(1− b(θ))− rσ
2
2
(1− b(θ))2
subject to (12).
The agent’s participation constraint (12) is binding at the optimum. Inserting the corre-
sponding expression of a(θ) into the maximand and optimizing with respect to b(θ) yields the
15This is particularly the case when their access to the capital market is restricted.
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expression of the optimal bonus:
b∗ =
1 + rσ2
1 + (r + ρ)σ2
< 1. (13)
Note that this bonus is independent of θ.
When the quality of the assets is common knowledge, the principal still bears a positive share
of the operational risk to, at least partially, insure the risk averse agent against fluctuations in
profits. The higher the agent’s degree of risk aversion, the lower the power of his incentives and
thus the lower the effort he provides under moral hazard.
Let us now turn to the case of interest where there is asymmetric information on θ, still fo-
cusing on the undominated separating equilibrium such that the agent’s participation constraint
(12) is binding and sustained with the same pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs as before. We
are looking for a decreasing schedule b(·) which satisfies:
θ = argmax
θˆ
(
S + θ +
1
2
+ (θˆ − θ)b(θˆ)− (1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θˆ))2 − ρσ
2
2
b2(θˆ)
)
. (14)
Standard revealed preferences arguments show that the equilibrium schedule bS(·) is mono-
tonically decreasing and thus almost everywhere differentiable. Following the same steps as in
Proposition 1, this schedule satisfies:
b˙S(θ) = − b
S(θ)
(1 + rσ2)
(
1− bS(θ)b∗
) , and bS(θ) = b∗. (15)
Clearly, the qualitative behavior of the solution is much like that of Proposition 1. In
particular, we have:
Proposition 5 : Assume that θ¯ − θ is small enough. In the unique undominated separating
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the risk averse principal bears more risk than under complete
information on θ: bS(θ) ≤ b∗ with equality only at θ. Moreover, as the agent becomes more risk
averse, bS(θ) decreases.
As the agent becomes more risk averse, it is more difficult for the principal to signal the
quality of the infrastructure by increasing the share of the operational risk he bears since he
must already bear some risk for coinsurance purposes. Therefore, credibly conveying information
on the quality of the infrastructure requires to significantly distort the bonus below its value
had quality being common knowledge. Formally, bS(θ) decreases with the agent’s risk aversion
ρ. Reinterpreting this result in terms of ownership structures along the lines of Section 4.2., risk
aversion on the agent’s side makes the case for public ownership stronger.
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5.2 Double Moral Hazard
As an owner of the infrastructure, the local government may also have to undertake a non-
verifiable investment ep to improve or maintain the quality of the existing infrastructure. The
realized profit that the firm may get now depends not only on the agent’s effort but also on the
principal’s investment as follows:
p˜i = θ + e+ αep + ε˜,
where ep costs ψ(ep) =
e2p
2 to the principal and α is a normalization parameter capturing the
importance of the principal’s investment into the project. Thanks to our additive formulation,
there is some substitutability between the investment made by the principal and the agent’s
effort which is a distinguishing feature of most public/private partnerships.16
Because investment is non-verifiable, the design of the concession contract must now solve a
double moral hazard problem. A share of the operational risk should also be borne by the risk
averse principal even if the quality of the infrastructure were common knowledge, just to give
him incentives to invest. Let us start with this benchmark. The first-order condition for the
principal’s moral hazard incentive constraint is:
ep(θ) = α(1− b(θ)). (16)
The principal’s problem becomes
max
{a(θ),b(θ)}
S + a(θ) + (1− b(θ))(θ + e(θ) + αep(θ))−
e2p(θ)
2
− rσ
2
2
(1− b(θ))2,
subject to (2), (16) and
θb(θ) + α2(1− b(θ))b(θ) + b
2(θ)
2
− a(θ) ≥ 0, (17)
where (17) is now the agent’s participation constraint. Of course, this last constraint is binding
and direct optimization leads to an optimal bonus independent of θ:
b∗ =
1 + rσ2
1 + rσ2 + α2
< 1. (18)
As his investment becomes more essential, providing incentives to the principal is more of a
concern. The principal must thus bear more risk and the agent’s bonus b∗ decreases with α.
Let us now analyze the case of asymmetric information on θ. Proceeding as before, an
undominated separating equilibrium defined in terms of the b(·) schedule satisfies the following
incentive constraints:
θ = argmax
θˆ
{
S + θ +
1
2
+ (θˆ − θ)b(θˆ) + α2(1− b(θˆ))b(θˆ)− (1 + rσ
2 + α2)
2
(1− b(θˆ))2
}
.
16On this substitutability between investment and operating effort, see for instance Daniels and Trebilcock
(2002).
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From this, we deduce again that the equilibrium strategy bS(·) is monotonically decreasing,
almost everywhere differentiable and that bS(·) satisfies again (15).
Proceeding as before, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 6 : Assume that θ¯ − θ is small enough. In the unique undominated separating
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the risk averse principal bears more risk than under complete
information on θ: bS(θ) ≤ b∗ with equality at θ only. As the principal’s effort becomes more
essential (α increases), bS(θ) decreases. On the contrary, greater risk aversion of the principal
and noisier performance of the agent increase bS(θ).
As his effort becomes more valuable to the project, the principal finds it more difficult to
signal the quality of the assets. Providing low power incentives to the agent both signals that
the technology is good and increases the principal’s own effort. Under double moral hazard, the
cost of signaling decreases and more distortions are needed to credibly signal the quality of the
infrastructure. Should we interpret our model in terms of ownership structures as in Section
4.2, double moral hazard would make it very attractive to keep public ownership.
This increase in the cost of signaling might also suggest that the task of improving the quality
of the facilities should also be delegated to the manager who runs the assets even in the absence
of any technological complementarity between those two tasks.17
5.3 Delegated Signaling
So far we have crudely modeled the behavior of the local government. We have assumed away
two possible conflicts of interests which may impact on the design of concession contracts. First,
there might be a conflict between uninformed voters and the informed public decision-maker
who may want to please the labor force employed in these utilities18 or to cajole the firm’s
shareholders in view of raising future campaign contributions. Second, even when political
principals are benevolent representatives of the electorate, there may still be a conflict between
elected political principals and the technical bureaus in charge of designing concession contracts
and restructuring ownership patterns.
To model these conflicts and analyze their impact, we envision now a hierarchy consisting
of a top principal representing voters and an intermediate principal whose objectives are partly
aligned with those of the industry and who has private information on the quality of the infras-
tructure. We are interested in the extent to which the design of concession contracts as well as
17On the issue of the optimal split between building and running public facilities, see Bennet and Iossa (2002)
and Hart (2003) in incomplete contracting models and Martimort and Pouyet (2005) in an agency framework.
18In this respect, the ownership structure does not really affect this congruence of interests between the decision-
maker and the firm’s labor force. Of course, it is clear that under public ownership, political decision-makers may
find a source of jobs in public utilities to get political support. However, private owners are often contractually
forced not to undertake any downsizing of the labor force.
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the decision to rely on public or private management reflect these possible conflicts of interests
and whether this extra degree of delegation biases the choice of the ownership structures in any
direction.
To capture the different political stimuli that may affect decision-making in local govern-
ments, we assume that the intermediate principal has preferences which give a positive weight
α ∈ (0, 1) to the firm’s expected profit U in his objective function. This congruence of interests
with the industry may reflect the existing political pressures exerted by the firm and its labor
force on this principal. At the same time, this principal wants to please voters and respond to
their incentives.
More precisely, let us suppose that incentives to this intermediate principal are provided by
means of a monetary transfer T obtained from voters. Although having the intermediate prin-
cipal respond to monetary incentives may be viewed as an ad hoc assumption, this approach
is quite tractable and provides a convenient modeling short-cut to encompass the discounted
private benefit that this principal obtains from retaining office by sufficiently pleasing the elec-
torate. Alternatively, this transfer T can also be viewed as the campaign contribution that the
principal may raise from the electorate. We will assume that T is costly to provide for the
electorate. This is consistent with both interpretations above. In the first case, voters suffer
from the cost of not electing a (potentially better) political principal tomorrow. In the second
case, they directly bear the monetary cost of the campaign contributions.
Taking into account both the electorate and the industry’s stimuli, the intermediate princi-
pal’s utility function can then be written as :
V = T + αU
where the weight on the firm’s profit, α, is less than one.
The voters’ welfare W can still be expressed as before:
W = S + pi − t(pi, θ)− T
where, for simplicity, we assume from now on that voters are risk neutral.
The uninformed electorate first offers a contract to the political decision-maker. This contract
aims at influencing the latter’s choice of bonus that signals quality to the firm. More specifically,
viewed as an indirect mechanism, the incentive contract T (b) offered by the electorate specifies a
monetary reward for the intermediate political principal as a function of his choice of a bonus for
the firm. We assume that the contract between the electorate and the principal is not observable
by the firm. Only the choice of a bonus made by the intermediate principal is.19
19Caillaud and Hermalin (1993) also modeled the use of an agent as a signaling device. Their concern is
rather different from ours since they provide a general theory with discrete types where adverse selection in the
principal-agent relationship undermines but does not destroy incentives to separate.
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Of course, in a separating equilibrium (if any exists), the equilibrium bonus be(θ) is invertible.
The firm then infers that assets are of quality (be)−1(b) if it observes that the principal chooses
any bonus b in the range of be(·), rg(be). When choosing a bonus b in that range and the true
quality of the infrastructure is θ, the political principal gets an expected payoff:
U(θ, b) = T (b) + α
(
(θ + e)b− e
2
2
− a
)
where e = b from the agent’s incentive constraint and a = (be)−1(b)b + b
2
2 so that the fixed-fee
extracts all the firm’s expected profit when the firm infers that the assets quality is (be)−1(b).
In any separating equilibrium, the intermediate principal’s incentive compatibility con-
straints can be expressed as:
U(θ) = max
b∈rg(be)
{
T (b) + α(θ − (be)−1(b))b} . (19)
The electorate commits to the contract T (b) before knowing the true value of θ. This contract
should thus maximize the expected welfare of the electorate and leads to a separating allocation
be(·). Solving for such separating equilibrium, we then find:
Proposition 7 : Assume that (1−α)θ+α1−F (θ)f(θ) is increasing in θ. Then there cannot be any
separating equilibrium.
There exists instead a pooling equilibrium such that the intermediate principal offers a con-
stant bonus whatever the quality of the infrastructure:
bp(θ) = bp = max {1− α(E(θ)− θ), 0} < 1. (20)
The intuition behind the pooling result is straightforward. Because his objective function is
partly congruent with the firm’s own objective, the intermediate principal wants to understate
the quality of the technology so that a smaller fixed-fee is paid by the firm and the latter gets
an information rent. At the same time, the basic signaling force of the previous sections still
matters so that voters would like to induce the intermediate principal to overstate the technology
to extract more from the firm. Because of those two countervailing forces, no type-contingent
contract can be used. Instead, a pooling equilibrium may be sustained.
Even with a pooling contract, higher values of the bonus b increase the information rent that
the intermediate principal can pocket. Indeed, the intermediate principal knows the realized
value of θ and has an objective partly congruent with the residual profit of the firm, i.e., whatever
the firm really gets minus the constant fixed-fee. A greater bonus increases this rent which is
socially costly. A lower value of b reduces this rent and thereby puts a constraint on the discretion
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of the intermediate principal. Low power incentives are again offered to the firm and a significant
share of the risk is retained by the electorate.20
Should we interpret of our model in terms of ownership structures as before, the existing
conflict of interests between voters and delegated principals would call now for an unconditional
shift towards more public ownership whatever the quality of the infrastructure.
6 Evidence From Water Utilities
The main prediction drawn from our theoretical model is that local governments rely more
heavily on high power incentives and on the private sector as the quality of the infrastructure
decreases.
In the empirical literature, a first approach examines the links between ownership and per-
formance by estimating an aggregate cost function for water utilities. Ownership effects are
usually captured by means of a dummy variable. For the U.S., Renzetti and Dupont (2003)21
show that this method does not allow us to draw robust conclusions in favor of a specific own-
ership structure.
One of the key assumptions of this approach is that firms, either public or private, minimize
costs. The agency literature shows that this assumption should be made with caution.22 Other
empirical studies have thus tried to compare private and public performances using a different
approach. For example, Bhattacharyya et al (1995) use a stochastic production frontier approach
to measure the impact of ownership on efficiency for water utilities in the U.S.. They show that
ownership matters and that public firms are more efficient than private firms.
One may nevertheless argue that even those empirical studies focusing on cost-minimization
distortions may not give a full account of the links between ownership structure and efficiency.
Some studies for France (Orwin (1999)) and for a sample of Californian communities (Houtsma
(2003)) tend to show that the private sector prices exceed those in the public sector by about
20%. This is often explained (Buller (1996)) by the fact that privatized utilities are more
numerous in areas where costs of supply are higher. This piece of evidence suggests that there
exists a strong technological bias in the choice of the ownership structure.23
The empirical investigation made by Reynaud and Thomas (2005) of the water industry in
20Our result on a non-informative equilibrium bears some resemblance with pure signaling models where an
agent signals his type simultaneously to multiple audiences with conflicting interests as in Gertner, Gibbons and
Sharfstein (1988) and Spiegel and Spulber (1997).
21See also earlier studies by Crain and Zarkoohi (1978), Bruggink (1982) and Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983).
22Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) uses a production frontier analysis which takes seriously this agency problem.
Although their concern is not water utilities but transportation in French local communities and they focus on
private information on the contractor’s side, they also recognize that the quality of service aggregates both an
adverse selection and a moral hazard component which are estimated.
23See also Duso and Ro¨ller (2003) for a similar point.
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the South-West of France is probably the best available evidence of this technological bias and,
as such, it provides strong evidence for our theory. They recognize that it is misleading to treat
ownership as an exogenous variable when estimating the cost function of water utilities. Taking
into account the technological bias, Reynaud and Thomas (2005) investigate the determinants
of water demand for more than one hundred French cities or communities (which is a group of
cities that collectively engage in water distribution). They ask whether delegation to the private
sector has any impact on water demand estimates and which characteristics, either observable
or unobservable, determine the choice to delegate to the private sector. When one estimates
water demand for a given community, it is quite natural to consider as explanatory variables
data concerning its population (age, wealth), the city itself (size, density) and possibly the
choice between direct and delegated management. This method, however, is potentially biased
since the last variable is certainly endogenous. A two-stage procedure is more appropriate and
this is the route followed by Reynaud and Thomas (2005). The first stage models the choice
between direct and delegated management. The second one integrates the previous result in
the demand equation. We are mainly interested in the first stage of the estimation procedure.
In addition to the standard explanatory variables (size, population density, industrial density),
Reynaud and Thomas (2005) also allow the quality of the network to predict whether direct
or delegated management is chosen. In the water industry, greater leakage is a property of a
lower efficient network. Since leakage occurs between the production stage and the distribution
(which is metered and billed), a natural measure of network quality, is the ratio of billed water
to produced water. The results of Reynaud and Thomas (2005) are clear: the higher the ratio,
the greater the probability that the municipally chooses direct management. This relationship
is significant at the 1% level. Even though Reynaud and Thomas (2005) do not present a full
economic model of choice between direct and delegated management, their empirical results are
consistent with our theory.
7 Conclusion
The goal of this article was to understand the various contractual forms that delegated manage-
ment of public utilities may take. We argued that the shape of those contracts results from a
trade-off between the desire of local governments to provide first-best incentives to the private
sector in running and operating assets and their own incentives to signal the quality of these
assets. We then analyze how this trade-off would be modified by various considerations: double
moral hazard, imperfect risk-sharing, or delegated decision-making. All those considerations
distort the cost of signaling and thus change the terms of trade-off between signaling and incen-
tives. These extensions have all in common that low power incentives (its extreme form being
public ownership in incomplete contracting environments) prevail for a large set of parameters
and that there exists a negative correlation between the power of incentives and the quality of
the infrastructure.
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This analysis has thus shed some light on where the boundary between the private and
the public sector should lie. Following Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) in interpreting resid-
ual claimancy contracts as private ownership, our model predicts a strong negative correlation
between the extent of private ownership and the power of incentives on the one hand and the
quality of the infrastructure on the other hand. In the case of the water industry, some empirical
studies seem to confirm this prediction.
It would be interesting to study several other extensions of our framework. First, it would be
worth understanding more properly how competitive bidding affects contractual terms. We have
supposed that potential service providers are identical from an ex ante viewpoint. In reality,
bidders may have also some private signals on the assets to be used. Those signals may come
from having run this technology in earlier periods in the case of contract renewal or from having
run a nearby facility with similar features, a case which is particularly relevant for water utilities.
Bidders will then bid differently depending on their signals and the extent by which the principal
will distort incentives for signaling reasons may depend on the precision of these signals.
Second, a standard paradigm in the analysis of procurement contracts has been to model
firms as having private information on their cost. Extensions of our framework to this double-
asymmetric information setting would be worth undertaking. The standard lessons in the lit-
erature is that extracting the service provider’s information rent calls for reducing the power
of incentives (see Laffont and Tirole (1993) for instance). Cast in terms of our model, bonuses
should be reduced. It is easy to extrapolate some of our findings to that case. We expect
adverse selection to increase the cost of signaling, calling for even lower power incentives and,
again broadening interpretation, an even stronger bias towards public ownership.
Also, partnerships between the public and the private sectors are most often durable commit-
ments lasting over several years. Those commitments are not frozen and may vary throughout
the life of the contract to adapt to new conditions and to the adoption of new techniques. It
would be important to understand how contracts are renegotiated in these environments. A
dynamic version of our model would differ from standard models of renegotiation in the liter-
ature (see Laffont and Tirole (1993) or Laffont and Martimort (2002)) both in terms of the
distribution of private information but also in terms of how information is learned over time.
Indeed, not only the offer of a first period contract will endogenously signal information to the
agent before later stages of contracting but some information may also be learned by looking at
the first realization of the profits. The pattern of information revelation in such settings would
be worth analyzing.
Lastly, our model supposes, as most of the literature on incentives does, that contracts are
perfectly enforced. However, our framework may also be used as a building block towards the
analysis of cases where concession contracts are signed in environments where enforcement is a
real concern like, for instance, in some developing countries. Indeed, even though investments
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in key infrastructures like for water or transportation are crucial to the economic growth and
welfare of such countries, contracts for concessionaries have been subject to much renegotiation
which have often impeded development.24 Renegotiation would be interesting to study within
the framework of this paper. We hope to investigate those issues in future research.
Appendix
• Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is straightforward and follows directly from the definition of a
separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium when off equilibrium path deviations induce pessimistic
beliefs.
• Proof of Lemma 2: Using (6) for types θ and θˆ, we get:
−(1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θ))2 ≥ b(θˆ)(θˆ − θ)− (1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θˆ))2. (A1)
Permuting types, we get instead:
−(1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θˆ))2 ≥ b(θ)(θ − θˆ)− (1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θ))2. (A2)
Summing (A1) and (A2) yields
0 ≥ (b(θ)− b(θˆ))(θ − θˆ)
and thus b(θ) is monotonically decreasing and thus almost everywhere differentiable.
• Proof of Proposition 1: From (6), we have
θ = argmax
θˆ
{
b(θˆ)(θˆ − θ)− (1 + rσ
2)
2
(1− b(θˆ))2
}
which admits the necessary first-order condition
b(θ) + (1 + rσ2)(1− b(θ))b˙(θ) = 0. (A3)
Note that b˙(θ) is decreasing only when b(θ) ≤ 1. Candidate equilibria have thus to lie below
1 everywhere on [θ, θ¯]. They are all characterized by the initial value b(θ) ≤ 1. Indeed, given the
out-of-equilibrium pessimistic beliefs used, the best contract that the principal can offer when
his type is θ is b(θ) = 1 with a(θ) = θ + 12 . Together with (A3), this initial condition defines
uniquely the equilibrium schedule bS(θ).
Given pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, a principal with type θ never chooses to offer
another contract (a, b) /∈ {aS(θˆ), bS(θˆ)}θˆ∈Θ when condition (5) holds. To see why, note that the
24An empirical analysis of these costs with a reduced form model is proposed in Guash, Laffont and Straub
(2002).
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maximal payoff of such a deviation is achieved when a = bθ+ b
2
2 and the maximum payoff from
such a deviation for principal θ is
max
b∈[0,1]
S + θb+
b2
2
+ (1− b)(θ + b)− rσ
2
2
(1− b)2.
This maximum is achieved for boff (θ) = 1− θ−θ
1+rσ2
which is a positive number when θ¯−θ ≤ 1+rσ2.
An unexpected deviation yields thus to the principal at most:
V off (θ) = max
b∈[0,1]
S + θb+
b2
2
+ (1− b)(θ + b)− rσ
2
2
(1− b)2.
Denote by V S(θ) the equilibrium value of the principal’s payoff. By definition, we have V S(θ) =
V off (θ), V˙ S(θ) = 1 − bS(θ) and V˙ off (θ) = 1 − boff (θ). Hence, a sufficient condition to ensure
that V S(θ) ≥ V off (θ) is bS(θ) ≤ boff (θ).
First, note that bS(θ) = boff (θ) = 1 and that b˙S(θ) = −∞ < b˙off (θ) = − 1
1+rσ2
so that
bS(θ) < boff (θ) on a right-neighborhood of θ. Let us find a condition ensuring that this inequality
remains true over the whole domain of definition [θ, θ¯]. Denote then by θ1 the first value of
θ > θ such that bS(θ) = boff (θ). At this point, if it exists on [θ, θ¯], we should have b˙S(θ1) =
− boff (θ1)
(1+rσ2)(1−boff (θ1)) ≥ b˙off (θ1) = −
1
1+rσ2
. This cannot occurs for any θ1 ∈ [θ, θ¯] if boff (θ1) > 12 .
This gives us the condition θ¯ − θ < 1+rσ22 .
• Proof of Proposition 3: The agent’s expected profit conditional on the quality of the
infrastructure, E(pi|θ), is defined as E(pi|θ) = θ + b(θ). Using the expression of b˙S(θ), we find:
dE(pi|θ)
dθ
= 1 + b˙S(θ) = 1− b
S(θ)
(1 + rσ2)(1− bS(θ)) . (A4)
which is positive if and only if bS(θ) ≤ bS(θˆ) = 1+rσ2
2+rσ2
, i.e., for θ ≥ θˆ large enough since bS(·) is
decreasing. Note that bS(θˆ) ≥ 12 , so that25 θˆ− θ < (log2− 12)(1 + rσ2) < 1+rσ
2
2 and thus such θˆ
exists within [θ, θ¯] when (log2− 12)(1 + rσ2) < θ¯ − θ < 1+rσ
2
2 .
• Proof of Proposition 4: To sustain that semi-separating equilibrium, suppose that any other
unexpected offer26 is interpreted as coming from the principal with type θ for sure. Clearly no
type within [θ, θ∗] wants to deviate by still privatizing since the fee that could be extracted
thereby is lower than a1. The best deviation for public production gives zero payoff to any of
those principals and is thus dominated also.
Types within [θ∗, θ¯] never want to deviate by privatizing and offering an off the equilibrium
fixed-fee which is acceptable because the fixed-fee they can get is always lower than a1 and they
already choose not to take it.
25Let θS(·) denote the inverse function of bS(·). We have dθS
db
= −(1 + rσ2) (1−b)
b
and thus θS(b) − θ =
(1 + rσ2)(b− 1− log b). We use this expression to compute an upper bound on θˆ.
26Since the two feasible bonus 0 and 1 are indeed used on the equilibrium path, the only concerns for unexpected
deviations come from the specification of the fixed-fee.
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Let us finally conclude on the partition structure of the equilibrium. Denote φ(x) =(
x− 1+rσ22
)
F (x) − ∫ xθ θf(θ)dθ. θ∗ is the only root of φ(x) = 0 greater than θ (note that
φ(θ) = 0. Note that φ′(x) = F (x) − 1+rσ22 f(x). From (MHR), φ′(·) changes sign at most once
on [θ, θ¯] and is first negative before being positive. θ∗ is thus unique.
Moreover, denoting θ∗(rσ2) the solution as a function of risk aversion and the variance of
profits, we have:
φ(θ∗(r1σ21)) =
1
2
(r1σ21 − rσ2)F (θ∗(r1σ21)) > 0
when r1σ21 > rσ
2. Hence, θ∗(r1σ21) > θ∗(rσ2).
• Proof of Proposition 5: Denote bS(θ, ρ) the unique solution to (15) and note that bS(θ, ρ1) >
bS(θ, ρ2) for ρ1 < ρ2. Suppose there exists θ1 > θ, where θ1 is the lowest value of θ such that
bS(θ1, ρ1) = bS(θ1, ρ2). Then at that point, from (15) we have 0 > b˙S(θ1, ρ1) > b˙S(θ1, ρ2) and
thus bS(θ, ρ2) > bS(θ, ρ1) for θ in [θ1 − ε, θ1] for ε small enough. A contradiction.
• Proof of Proposition 7: Using the Envelope Theorem, we get from (19):
U˙(θ) = αb(θ), (A5)
with the second-order condition
b˙(θ) ≥ 0. (A6)
Of course, the political principal will participate if and only if
U(θ) ≥ 0. (A7)
We now conjecture the existence of a separating equilibrium implementing a bonus schedule
be(θ) and we will show that this leads to a contradiction. If such an equilibrium exists, the
optimal contract offered by the electorate (or top principal) to the delegated principal must
maximize the following objective:∫ θ¯
θ
f(θ)
(
S + (1− b(θ))(θ + b(θ)) + (be)−1(b(θ))b(θ) + b
2(θ)
2
+ α(θ − be−1(b(θ)))b(θ)− U(θ)
)
dθ
subject to (A5) and (A6),
with the added equilibrium condition that be(θ) is the solution to this problem. Note that we
have expressed T (b(θ)) using (19) to rewrite the maximand.27
27Also, note that, following any unexpected offer (corresponding to b /∈ rg(be)), we don’t need to specify the
firm’s beliefs. In particular, they may not necessarily be the most pessimistic ones. The corresponding incentive
constraints preventing such unexpected deviations are indeed not used in the rest of the proof below to get that
no separating equilibrium may arise. Only those incentive constraints stating that be(θ) is preferred in state θ to
be(θˆ) for any θˆ are used.
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Let us first neglect the second-order condition (A6). ¿From (A7) binding at θ only and (A5),
we get
U(θ) = α
∫ θ
θ
b(x)dx. (A8)
Inserting into the voters’ objective function and integrating by parts yields a new expression for
the maximand∫ θ¯
θ
f(θ)
(
S+(1−b(θ))(θ+b(θ))+be−1(b(θ))b(θ)+b
2(θ)
2
+α(θ−be−1(b(θ)))b(θ)−α1− F (θ)
f(θ)
b(θ)
)
dθ.
(A9)
Optimizing pointwise and taking into account that the optimum must be achieved at be(θ)
at a separating equilibrium, we get the following incentive compatibility condition that states
that be(θ) is preferred in state θ to be(θˆ) for any θˆ:
θ + be(θ)− (b
e(θ))2
2
− α1− F (θ)
f(θ)
be(θ)
≥ (1−be(θˆ))(θ+be(θˆ))+ θˆbe(θˆ)+ (b
e(θˆ))2
2
+α(θ− θˆ)be(θˆ)−α1− F (θ)
f(θ)
be(θˆ) for all (θ, θˆ) in Θ2.
(A10)
Adding (A10) with a similar condition obtained by permuting θ and θˆ yields
(be(θˆ)− be(θ))
(
(1− α)θ + α1− F (θ)
f(θ)
−
(
(1− α)θˆ + α1− F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
))
≥ 0. (A11)
Assuming that (1− α)θ + α1−F (θ)f(θ) is increasing with θ yields that be(θ) must be monotonically
decreasing and thus almost everywhere differentiable with
b˙e(θ) ≤ 0. (A12)
Clearly, (A12) and (A6) are conflicting and there cannot be any fully separating equilibrium.
Let us now look for a pooling equilibrium sustained with passive beliefs (whatever the bonus
offered off the equilibrium, the firm continues to hold prior beliefs) such that b(θ) = b, the
principal receives a fixed payment T and the fixed-fee in the firm’s contract is fixed for all θ in
Θ.
Now the firm’s effort is e = b for any θ and acceptance of the contract occurs when the
pooling fixed-fee is such that a ≤ E(θ)b + b22 . Again, we focus on the case where this fixed-fee
just extracts all the firm’s expected profit.
When choosing a pooling bonus b, the electorate anticipates that the principal obtains thus
a rent
U(θ, b) = T + α(θ − E(θ))b.
To ensure participation by all types, it must be that
T ≥ α(E(θ)− θ)b,
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and of course the transfer to the intermediate principal is minimized when this constraint is
binding.
Inserting this expression of T into the electorate’s objective function gives us a new expression
of the electorate’s maximization program
max
{b}
∫ θ¯
θ
f(θ)
(
S + (1− b)(θ + b) + E(θ)b+ b
2
2
− α(E(θ)− θ)b
)
dθ. (A13)
Optimizing for positive bonus gives then (20).
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